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Credit and Co-Wives: 
exploring empowerment in Senegal 
 
By AMELIA DUFFY- TUM ASZ 
 
ABSTRACT: With promises of 
“bottom-up” economic development and 
women’s empowerment, microfinance 
has been established as the “new 
orthodoxy” in mainstream development 
circles (Fernando 1997).  This study 
suggests a more limited potential for 
microfinance to reduce poverty, 
however.  Instead of alleviating poverty, 
microfinance may be improving the 
incomes of already established, 
relatively prosperous women micro-
entrepreneurs.  How enhanced income 
translates into social power for women 
will be a central theme of this essay.  
Specifically, this topic will be treated 
within the urban, polygamous and 
Senegalese context.  The role that 
ideology plays in this process will also 
be crucial.  Polygamy can be understood 
as such an ideology aiding in income’s 
transformation into power for women.  
This consideration helps make the case 
that women’s empowerment is a 
complex process that requires both 
female income and a value system that 
validates such productivity. 
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2Each morning a taxi would drive me to the end of the paved road where cement 
met terracotta sand and where the path to Khelkom began.  I would hoist up my long skirt 
and make my way through the cement block houses to the step of the song that the 
omnipresent children sang.  “Toubab, toubab” (stranger, stranger) they would call after 
me as if I did not already know that I was a foreigner in this dusty land.  Despite the 
temptation to retreat into my whiteness, I would greet virtually every person I passed- a 
cultural necessity in Senegal- with words that soothed even the heat of the sun.  “Peace to 
you” I heard in every direction as people descended from their homes into the seemingly 
endless work of the quickly warming day. 
I would walk toward the cement structures that announced the center of the 
outdoor fish-processing factory, Khelkom that was my field-site.  While the other 
structures were made of bamboo, wood and straw these buildings appeared as foreign as 
the money used to construct them.  Despite the fact that they were built with the intention 
of improving the sanitation infrastructure of the workers, I never saw anyone enter or 
leave them during the work day.  As an outsider, I came to Khelkom like one of those 
buildings, built with good intentions and idealism.  I was determined to learn something 
about the celebrated intersection of women’s empowerment and microfinance in the 
developing world and to start in this place that pushed all of my limits.  Like those 
buildings, however, it became clear very quickly that I stuck out and that in order to 
participate in any meaningful conversation I had to listen first. 
 
* * * * *
3Introduction  
Embodied in the developing world by widespread structural adjustment programs, 
the age of privatization has greatly impacted the daily lives of urban West Africans.  As 
devolution of state responsibility has re-defined the notion of social services, the advent 
of microfinance as a development tool has come to occupy a special place on the global 
development agenda.  With promises of “bottom-up” economic development and 
women’s empowerment, microfinance has generated much optimism concerning its 
potential to transform structural inequalities.  Though local structures of informal 
microfinance have been widely documented in the developing world for decades, the 
current excitement arguably centers on the famous success of the Grameen Bank in rural 
Bangladesh, created by Muhammad Yunnus in 1977.  Since then, this model has been 
replicated and adapted throughout the world as a means to poverty alleviation, gaining 
much political currency.  Perhaps this mainstreaming of the microfinance concept is best 
demonstrated by the United Nation’s commemoration of 2005 as the “International Year 
of Micro-credit”.     
 As state-led approaches to development are increasingly being replaced by 
market-led strategies, proponents and critics alike are interested in the implications of 
such a neoliberal transition.  Specifically, feminists, anthropologists and others have 
examined how putting money into women’s pockets has affected gender relations at 
micro and macro levels.  How enhanced income translates into social power for women 
will be a central theme of this essay.  The role that ideology plays in this process will also 
be crucial.  Specifically, these topics will be treated within the urban, polygamous and 
Senegalese context.  This particular milieu is useful for investigating the question of 
4female empowerment because it introduces new possibilities for women’s financial 
success, including access to microfinance and new options for family living 
arrangements.     
After providing the reader with some economic and historical context for 
understanding the Senegalese case, I will conduct a review of the relevant literature.  
Within this framework I will then analyze qualitative and quantitative data that was 
collected at my fieldsite this summer.  I will try to address the following questions.  What 
is the evolution of microfinance in the Senegalese context?  To what extent does the 
current microfinance structure show potential for poverty reduction at Khelkom? What is 
the role of microfinance in women’s empowerment in the urban, polygamous and 
Senegalese context?   
Exploring the interaction between microfinance and polygamy will help 
contextualize the complex relationship between income, ideology and empowerment in 
the studied environment.  Ultimately, this project aims to examine the relationship 
between the two goals of economic development and enhanced social power for women 
with the intention of setting more explicit criteria for assessing the fundamental goal of 
female empowerment on the global development agenda. 
 
Background 
Located on the western coast of Africa, the Republic of Senegal was established 
in 1960 after hundreds of years of considerable French influence.  The post-colonial 
transition was peaceful, led by the Nobel Prize winning poet-president Leopold Senghor.  
The country has enjoyed relative social and political stability since independence and as 
5an exemplary West African nation has received much international aid.  Economically, 
however, Senegal has experienced much hardship.  This financial insecurity must be 
understood both in terms of Senegal’s colonized past and of its more recent economic 
history.  This economic context is essential in framing the subject of poverty alleviation 
tools and in unpacking what the UN General Assembly means when it categorizes 
Senegal as a “least developed country” (LDC).  
After independence, Senghor implemented socialist governmental policies that in 
theory if not in practice provided for the basic needs of the country’s citizens.  In 1978, 
motivated by mounting international debt and the high costs of running a socialist state, 
Senegal adopted its first program of structural adjustment as defined by the World Bank 
(WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Accompanying policies ushered in a shift 
away from state-directed to market-based approaches to social service provision.  
Senegal’s experience is not singular.  In the era of privatization, state responsibility for 
citizen welfare has been devolved to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in many 
contexts, having important consequences for the conceptualization of state responsibility 
vis-à-vis its citizens.  Microfinance is one initiative that is representative of this shift.  
This push to transform the poor into entrepreneurs who are responsible for themselves 
conveniently relieves the international community as well as national governments of 
some of their previous responsibilities.   
The consequences of such a neoliberal paradigm are clear.  Between 1992 and 
2002, twenty-six percent of the Senegalese population lived on less than one US dollar 
per day (www.unicef.org/inforbycountry/Senegal).  In short, over a quarter of Senegalese 
people live in conditions defined by absolute poverty.  Debatably, Senegal’s structural 
6adjustment programs are not benefiting the country’s poor as social services are 
commoditized into products for which the poor become responsible for buying.  While 
welfare programs were once conceptualized as initiatives that occurred at the federal 
level, now poverty alleviation is happening from the “bottom-up” as microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) reach disenfranchised populations one at a time.       
Urbanization is gaining momentum as a trend as rural dwellers migrate to the city 
with the hope of finding more lucrative employment.  This accelerating trend, coupled 
with high formal sector unemployment means that many Senegalese are not equipped 
with the means to provide for themselves or their families.  Joal-Fadiouth is one example 
of a growing city.  Today, the population is estimated at 35, 000 and as one of the major 
cities in the relatively poor region of Thies, it is expected to continue to expand in size. 
Interestingly, unlike national percentages that estimate 95 percent of the population to be 
Muslim, Joal-Fadiouth has a sizable Christian population.  In addition to the numerous 
mosques located around the city, there is also a church whose congregation prides itself 
on its peaceful cohabitation with Muslim neighbors.    
My fieldsite was located in this growing city, off the two paved roads a few 
kilometers from the Atlantic shore.  Named Khelkom, my worksite plays an essential role 
in the local and national economy by transforming the fish that is brought in from the sea 
into marketable, packageable and delicious products.  Khelkom can best be understood as 
an outdoor fish factory where mostly femmes transformatrices (female fish artisans) 
work.  Almost 30 percent of Senegal’s GDP comes from the fishing industry and as one 
of Senegal’s foremost fishing centers, Joal-Fadiouth’s local economy has national 
consequences.  Local subsistence- from the survival of the banks to the street vendors- is 
7derived from the city’s primary resource of fish.  The quality of life of Joaliens is thus 
dependent on the ability of fishermen to procure resources from the sea.  Unlike Mbour, a
tourist town thirty kilometers up the road, pirogues still line the beaches, reminding 
pedestrians that Joal-Fadiouth remains fundamentally a fishing village. 
 
Literature Review  
 The following section will review the existing literature on five major topics.  
These subjects will include: income versus ideology as the determining factor in female 
empowerment, the history of microfinance in the developing world, microfinance and 
poverty reduction, microfinance and female empowerment, and the household economics 
of polygamy in the Senegalese context.  
Income, ideology and empowerment 
Ester Boserup’s landmark book Women’s Role in Economic Development laid 
the groundwork for the field of Women in Development (WID) in 1970.  The study of 
antipoverty and empowerment approaches within structurally adjusted economies are 
common themes within this literature (Peet 1999), with microfinance as one current 
example.  The relationship between enhanced income and empowerment has been an 
important topic in this sub-area, with two views predominating.  The first is that women’s 
subordination originates from their inferior incomes in relation to men’s.  Accordingly, 
Rae Lesser Blumberg in Income Under Female Versus Male Control: Hypotheses from a 
Theory of Gender Stratification and Data from the Third World argues that when women 
control their incomes and hold property, they have greater control over their own lives.  
This generalized control is manifest in a woman’s enhanced self-esteem, sense of self-
8reliance, control over fertility, and household decision-making power.  In short, money in 
women’s pockets will help them assert themselves in new ways.  In addition, studies 
show that women spend their money differently than mean.  Notably, they tend to spend 
relatively more of their incomes on child nutrition, having positive consequences for 
family welfare (1988).  In sum, Blumberg argues that income matters most to female 
empowerment.     
While most scholars agree that income is fundamental, others assert that 
prevailing cultural values about women and women’s work determine if enhanced female 
incomes translate into social power.  This means that the money that women earn is 
filtered through a cultural lens that acts as a “discount rate” (Blumberg 1988) to any 
social power that increased incomes may help generate.  Proponents of this explanation 
argue that ideology along with income matters in female empowerment (Fernandez-Kelly 
1983; Tiano 1994).  In Market Success or Female Autonomy? : Income, Ideology, and 
Empowerment among Microentrepreneurs in the Dominican Republic Grasmuck and 
Espinal add that “income threshold effects” govern to what extent money buys power for 
women.  They conclude that small amounts of female-controlled income result in small 
gains in household power for women while intermediate amounts result in comparatively 
larger increases.  Relatively high amounts of income, conversely, can backlash on female 
entrepreneurs with documented cases of husbands taking over their wives’ prosperous 
micro-businesses (2000).  This debate about the relative importance of income and 
ideology will help frame the question of microfinance’s potential for female 
empowerment in a polygamous context.       
History of microfinance in the developing world 
9Like in many developing countries, microfinance is not a wholly new concept in 
Senegal.  Instead, local structures have existed since pre-colonial times and continue to 
provide women with efficient ways of managing their money today.  Most widespread is 
the tontine, or the Senegalese version of the rotating savings and credit association 
(ROSCA) which provides its exclusively female membership with an autonomous 
savings and credit mechanism through which members access informal financial services.  
Shirley Ardener, an anthropologist whose work on ROSCAs is considered seminal, 
defines the rotating savings and credit association as organization “formed upon a core of 
participants who make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, 
to each contributor in rotation” (1964).  As suggested by this definition, the ROSCA 
structure is a highly adaptable, efficient, and locally-defined structure that helps “poor 
people” manage their money (Rutherford 2000).  This structure is widespread throughout 
the developing world as a locally-generated and managed form of microfinance.  The 
ROSCA’s prevalence helps make the case that microfinance is not the sole invention of 
the Grameen Bank or of its followers.  
Now that some urban Senegalese women have access to different kinds of credit, 
including that offered by the ROSCA and other MFIs, Abdoulaye Kane in Financial 
Arrangements across Borders: Women’s Predominant Participation in Popular Finance, 
from Thilogne and Dakar to Paris. A Senegalese Case Study questions the widespread 
preference of the ROSCA as a form of money management.  He discusses the popularity 
of the tontine with Senegalese women by understanding it as a structure that reflects the 
importance of reciprocal relations in West African culture.  Grounded in traditions of 
gift-exchange, the tontine serves as an exclusively women’s space that provides the 
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opportunity for participants to share knowledge, build group solidarity and support 
networks, and to build financial independence from their husbands (2001).  Despite 
current trends that emphasize credit as the primary means to women’s economic and 
social empowerment, tontines show that savings and credit are both essential components 
in the recipe to economic success.  Thus, while MFIs may have introduced a new way for 
women to manage their money, it is important to note that local structures have been 
effectively providing microfinancial services for years.  This assertion, however, does not 
mean that demand for formalized credit services is low.  Instead, many scholars point out 
that the demand for additional credit services greatly exceeds the existing supply of loans 
earmarked for the world’s poor, bolstering the case for more institutionalized credit.     
In 1977 Muhammad Yunnus acknowledged this credit problem of the poor and 
founded the Grameen Bank which is considered the first largely successful MFI.  Begun 
in rural Bangladesh, Yunnus pioneered the “village banking model” by giving small, low-
interest loans to members with the intention of funding their income-generating activities.  
The fundamental concept was that access to micro-credit would foster the growth of 
micro-entrepreneurs, encouraging the self-reliance of poor, rural Bangladeshis.  
Collective loans were given to borrowing groups, formed on the basis of social networks 
that would self-manage the distribution and repayment of funds.  This was innovative 
because it cut down on administrative costs due to the self-regulatory nature of the groups 
and, by building on already existing social relations, the formation of the groups ensured 
that members were credible in the eyes of the community.   In turn, the social capital of 
members was substituted for the physical collateral that commercial banks traditionally 
required (Bornstein 1997).  This “peer pressure mechanism” involved social and 
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community consequences if a member defaulted.  Ultimately, this has proved 
overwhelmingly effective in ensuring repayment of loans, with numbers reaching almost 
100 percent (Mohiuddin).  Such quantitative success of the bank helps explain the 
optimism surrounding microfinance on the global development agenda today.    
An interesting component of the development of the Grameen Bank involves the 
gendered distribution of its membership.  Over time, the bank’s administrators realized 
that women were better candidates for loans than their male counterparts.  In addition to 
having more reliable repayment rates, women tended to reinvest the money in their 
businesses while profits tended to go towards their children and families’ needs 
(Blumberg 1988; Kabeer 1994; Bornstein 1997).  Other scholars point out that this 
targeting of women coincided with donors’ prerogatives to fund women’s development 
projects.  Though the Grameen Bank is only one of many microfinance models in 
operation today, the village banking approach is most applicable to the case study of 
Khelkom. Regardless, today it is the interaction of international projects and local tontine 
models of microfinance that generate the distinct flavor of microfinance in urban 
Senegalese communities.   
Promise of poverty reduction 
In Microfinance and Poverty Reduction Johnson and Rogaly illustrate how 
microfinance can be understood as a poverty alleviation tool.  By providing low-interest 
credit to groups that are not otherwise eligible for formalized loans, microfinance can be 
seen as a means to “bottom-up” development by providing the poor with the tools of self-
employment and ultimately, self-sustainability (1997).  Quantitative indicators such as 
high repayment rates and increases in participants’ incomes bolster this argument.  
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International development experts’ faith in microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool is 
built on such evidence.  Perhaps their optimism was best illustrated at the Micro-credit 
Summit in Washington DC in 1997 when 20 billion dollars was devoted to microfinance 
programs worldwide.  This event demonstrates that the self-reliance of the poor is an 
attractive approach for development agencies and donors alike.   
Still, critics raise important questions about microfinance’s potential for poverty 
reduction in the developing world.  One observer points out that saving as opposed to 
borrowing money is the key variable in reducing poverty (Buckley 1997; Murdoch 1999).  
Another researcher reiterates that quantitative indicators of increased female incomes do 
not show female control of such earnings (Fernando 1997).  Incidentally, female control 
of income is a crucial variable in improving child nutrition in the developing world 
(Tripp 1981; Guyer 1980).  Unlike income, moreover, child nutrition statistics are 
tangible indicators of how welfare is affected by changes in family income.  Others 
emphasize that no systematic method of data collection has been implemented regarding 
the actual poverty reduction benefits that MFIs ostensibly generate (Fernando 1997; 
Mayoux 1999).  Perhaps most troubling is the criticism that village banking models are 
not reaching the “poorest of the poor” (Bornstein 1997; Johnson and Rogaly 1997), 
suggesting that the neediest populations are bypassed in the process of making MFIs 
financially viable institutions.      
Regardless of microfinance’s debated benefits or limitations, Katharine Rankin in 
Governing development: neoliberalism, microcredit, and rational economic woman 
points out the concurrent ascendancy of microfinance as a poverty alleviation strategy 
and the proliferation of neoliberal economic policies throughout the world.  She argues 
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that micro-credit is a means to the neoliberal end of devolving a state’s responsibilities to 
its own citizens.  In short, MFIs are privatized social welfare programs.  In this light, 
“bottom-up” development individualizes blame for poverty.  Consequently, microfinance 
obscures structural constraints that actually limit individuals’ financial agency (2001).  In 
sum, while it is unclear if microfinance is generally improving women’s incomes or 
control of those incomes, many scholars agree that there are reasons to be wary of the 
optimism engendered by this new development tool.   
Theory versus Practice: the question of female empowerment 
As microfinance programs flourish and more women gain access to credit 
services, mainstream development institutions have conceptualized microfinance as a tool 
for women’s empowerment.  Funded by the World Bank, Marguerite S. Robinson in The 
Microfinance Revolution: sustainable finance for the poor argues that access to credit 
services improves the quality of life and self-confidence of female clients, making the 
argument that microfinance empowers women borrowers (2001).  Others cite women’s 
increased earnings as an indicator of increased household decision-making power while 
some maintain that bringing women into the public sphere through employment will help 
solve gender inequities.  Many have started to coin this optimism as a “panacea” view of 
microfinance (Rankin 2001; Fernando 1997), highlighting the cure-all characteristic that 
microfinance has assumed in development circles.    
Building on previous works involving income and ideology, some scholars have 
started to qualitatively examine the potential for women to translate improved incomes 
into social power in the context of microfinance.  In his article Nongovernmental 
Organizations, Micro-Credit, and the Empowerment of Women Jude Fernando 
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investigates the process through which high repayment rates are achieved at one village 
bank in rural Bangladesh.  Labeling the microfinance trend a “new orthodoxy” on the 
development agenda, he suggests that this new poverty alleviation and empowerment tool 
is structurally problematic.  His findings show that substituting social capital for physical 
collateral requires lending groups to build on pre-existing social relations to function.  As 
a result, well-established local hierarchies perpetuate (1997).  Rankin continues that 
building on local social structures contributes to the uneven distribution of economic and 
social benefits for microfinance participants (2002).  These findings shed light on the 
study of women’s empowerment.  If the very mechanisms that ensure the financial 
success of a microfinance organization are exacerbating inequalities among women, it is 
clear that female empowerment is a concept relative to one’s position within local 
hierarchies.  
Another important consideration is the sense of collective responsibility for 
repayment encouraged by the village banking structure.  Because loan size is increased 
only when the entire group repays on-time, peer group pressure dominates as the 
mechanism that regulates loan investment and repayment (Bornstein 1997; Fernando 
1997).  This arrangement strains women’s personal relationships since they tend to be the 
basis for group formation.  There have even been documented cases of domestic violence 
against women who risk default (Rahman 1999).  Though cases of domestic violence 
may be extreme examples, they do show that access to microfinance services may 
involve unquantifiable costs for some female borrowers.  In addition, such possible 
outcomes suggest that empowerment depends on a multiplicity of factors, making it 
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unreasonable to assert that it comes as an automatic by-product of microfinance 
participation.      
Polygamy as ideology  
Since this study is interested in microfinance and its potential for female 
empowerment in a specific urban and Senegalese context, the basic rules of the 
polygamous household economy will be discussed.  This ideological background will 
frame the forthcoming discussion of women and women’s work roles in this particular 
environment.   
Like microfinance, polygamy is a structure that has the potential to encourage the 
economic agency of some women participants.  This is possible because of the principle 
of domestic equality.  Co-wives who live together, for example, rotate domestic duties, 
effectively lessening each woman’s work in the household (Boserup 1970; Diop 1985).  
With the time saved on doing housework, women may have greater opportunities to 
pursue economic activities outside of the home.  In The Heritage of Islam: Women, 
Religion, and Politics in West Africa Callaway and Creevey point out that women in 
polygamous marriages are encouraged to maintain separate budgets from their co-wives 
because of the mere complexity of the family structure.  This cultural norm suggests that 
co-wives may have greater control over their earned incomes than their monogamous 
counterparts.  Historical records show that such rules governing income date back to pre-
Islamic times (1994).  Despite the fact that polygamy may encourage female financial 
autonomy, however, Senegalese writers suggest that the institution systematically fosters 
jealousy among co-wives, creating potential conflict within the primary structure of 
women’s lives (Ba 1979; Diop 1985).  These testimonies suggest that personal costs may 
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accompany the potential economic benefits that polygamy can provide for co-wives.  In 
sum, control of income has been shown to be one of the determining variables in 
translating female income into social power.  Since co-wives control the money that they 
make in accordance with established cultural and religious norms, polygamy provides a 
unique lens through which we can examine income flow in urban Senegal.  
 
Methodology  
 Since many of the scholars concerned with the question of women’s 
empowerment have determined qualitative data collection as the appropriate approach to 
evaluating such a process, I employed largely ethnographic methods in conducting this 
project.  I traveled to Joal, Senegal in the early summer of 2005 and lived there for ten 
weeks.  I went to my worksite every morning and spent my days as an intern with the 
largely male administrators.  My duties involved talking with women about the services 
provided and how they could be improved.  The federation of microfinance lending 
groups is called Jumbugum (I want peace) and I used this organization as the case study 
for this project.  As the summer went on, I spent more and more time with the women 
workers and understood my work with them as participant observation.  Through the time 
I spent at the worksite and the relationships I developed there, I conducted many formal 
and informal interviews.  I decided against using a tape recorder because I felt like it 
would introduce a whole other dimension of outsider to my research.  Instead, I took 
notes, recording outlines of conversations and direct quotes that I thought were pertinent 
to my research.  During this time I also conducted a focus group in a women’s tontine 
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meeting where I was able to ask open-ended questions about microfinance, women’s 
work and polygamy.   
Towards the end of my stay, when I was on a first name basis with many of the 
women workers, I conducted a survey of the female working population.  I interviewed 
twenty-three women for this part of my research.  The survey was conducted orally with 
the help of a translator.  Five out of the twenty-three women spoke French so that direct 
communication was possible.  The other eighteen spoke Wolof, making the translator 
necessary.  The form that was used as a guide is attached in the appendix section of this 
paper.  In addition, I lived in the home of a polygamous family.  My home-stay 
experience greatly informed my work.     
 *  *  *  *  * 
The following section will use primary data to contrast two views on women’s 
empowerment.  The first is that income matters most in this process.  The second is that 
ideology, or values about women and their gender roles matter more.  I will raise this 
issue in the narrow context of income from microfinance in urban Senegal.  To start, I 
will try to understand the evolution of microfinance in Senegal and raise some questions 
about its particular development there.  I will then bring some informal research to bear 
on the questions of poverty alleviation and female empowerment, especially in the urban 
and polygamous context.  The polygamous context provides this study with an 
ideological framework that has the potential to both hinder and facilitate women’s 
translation of money into power.  Ultimately, I will try to understand the interaction 
between this ideology and the income that microfinance may provide in order to explore 
the complex process of female empowerment in urban Senegal.      
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Women as Historians: an introduction to outsiders’ microfinance   
Embedded in microfinance are the hopes for poverty reduction and empowerment 
for its users.  However, enhanced social power is contingent upon microfinance’s ability 
to act firstly as an effective poverty alleviation tool.  Indeed, enhanced income would be 
the central link in the argument that microfinance contributes to women’s empowerment.  
Accordingly, to approach the question of empowerment is to first assess claims of 
community economic development in the Senegalese context.  To what extent did 
internationally flavored microfinance contribute to poverty reduction at Khelkom?
Though it was impossible to collect quantitative data of changes in income reflecting the 
time period between when the microfinance infrastructure was introduced and the 
present-day, the history of microfinance at Khelkom does shed light on the potential for 
poverty reduction in the studied context.  The following narrative was recorded during a 
formal interview with one femme transformatrice at Khelkom.
In 1993 or 1995, PROPAC came into Joal.  The first concrete buildings were 
constructed at Khelkom and financed by PROPAC.  They initiated the 
microfinance infrastructure too so that women would be organized to receive 
global loans.  PROPAC educated the women about money and how to budget 
their money.  The women were organized into groups because the banks and 
NGOs didn’t want to help individual women.  They wanted to lend to groups.   
Since affinities among the women existed already, we organized the groups by 
feelings.  By feelings I mean women who get along well together, who have 
gained each other’s trust because they get to know each other while they are 
resting and eating…  Around 1995 to 1996 the groups began to receive loans.  
19
With PROPAC’s loans, the money was lent in the name of the president who was 
the responsible one to reimburse the money…Today there is no more global 
funding.  We borrow money from banks instead.  The treasurer, who is a moral 
person, takes care of the money that is lent.  The reimbursement for the banks 
lasts a long time, for example six months.  The treasurer gives structure to the 
reimbursement by collecting money at the end of each month. 
Female president of one such group, Fatou Kandje helps illuminate some of the 
ways in which the introduction of the “microfinance infrastructure” at Khelkom mirrors 
the village banking model of microfinance.  No physical guarantees were required to 
participate.  Instead, the program circumvented traditional banking requirements by using 
social capital as a proxy for physical collateral requirements.  Theoretically, this social 
collateral mechanism is central to village banking microfinance as a poverty alleviation 
tool because it allows poor people with no start-up capital to access lines of formalized 
credit (Bornstein 1997).  However, in this context microfinance did not provide a 
sustainable way of financing the micro-businesses of the poor.  Instead, after the lending 
groups were established female participants received micro-loans from the agency for 
less than two years.  While it can be argued that some women may have benefited from 
the start-up capital provided within this short time period, it would be difficult to make 
the argument that PROPAC ameliorated the living conditions of all women borrowers.  
Simply, the development program left.  Thus, unless it can be shown that such a limited 
experience with a MFI led to sustainable financing for the women borrowers, one can 
conclude that microfinance did not justify claims about poverty reduction at Khelkom.
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Fatou’s account was corroborated by a site administrator, Boucar Diouf.  In 
addition to acting as a translator for the interview, Boucar added that the PROPAC 
program came at the same time as a government initiative that organized informal sector 
laborers into groupements d’interet economique (GIE), or groups of economic interest.  
This was in response to the growth of employment in the informal sector in urban 
Senegal.  The GIE initiative served two intertwined purposes: to facilitate the economic 
development of informal sector workers and to organize the landscape of the informal 
market so that aid agencies could target populations more effectively.  Funded by the 
French Development Agency, the European Union and the Senegalese government, 
PROPAC was one aid agency that helped facilitate the formation of such groups in Joal.  
As for the assessment of the microfinance program’s capacity to reduce poverty, on the 
other hand, perhaps the development agency’s swift exit speaks for itself.  Or maybe 
Boucar summarized the events more diplomatically when he commented that the 
federation of GIEs at Khelkom was “a baby that ha(d) been born but not yet taken its first 
steps”.  Regardless of the relative success or failure of the microfinance initiative, 
however, it is difficult to argue that PROPAC initiated sustainable economic 
development at Khelkom.  Coincidentally, this is the time period in which microfinance 
was gaining momentum as a development trend on the global agenda.  Interestingly, 
microfinance advocates’ claims to poverty reduction were not sustained, if even begun, 
by the micro-credit program itself in the case of Khelkom.
Microfinance’s Evolution: survival of the fittest?   
Senegalese women are resourceful in many creative ways.  Time and time again I 
witnessed how problems were solved with recycled materials and a little imagination.  
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Wire coat hangers and scraps of old dresses transformed into a child’s doll, the contents 
of old batteries sprinkled on work spaces to keep away the ubiquitous flies, old tires 
stacked to make trash bins, leftover rice molded into patties to be fried for the next 
morning’s breakfast.  In a world of limited resources, adaptation evidently becomes a 
way of life.  Though it was hard for me to accept that “doing without” was an acceptable 
way to live, what else could they do?  Throw up their hands in frustration?  Collapse with 
exhaustion?  No, I was reminded, Senegalese women elles sont braves. They have no 
fear.  I learned from their examples that it is better to work with what one has than to 
worry about what is lacking.  It should have been no surprise to me, then, that even in the 
absence of sustainable funding these women manipulated the remnants of microfinance 
in remarkable ways.  The irony is that this kind of adaptation was not what I imagined 
when I had read about the advantages of “bottom-up” development in the microfinance 
literature.  Then again, I had also not expected illiterate women to be able to do all of 
their financial calculating and bookkeeping in their heads.  Bit by bit I was learning to 
give these women more of the credit that they deserved.  
I mention these memories because like those old wire hangers, the femmes 
transformatrices of Khelkom retained microfinance’s basic ideas and found new uses for 
them.  While I have argued that widespread poverty reduction was not an outcome of the 
PROPAC micro-credit program, the evolution of microfinance since the agency’s 
departure presents new elements which warrant examination.  Again, no quantitative data 
was collected concerning actual increases in income as a result of women’s participation 
in evolving microfinance.  Still, the way in which the microfinance structure has been 
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adapted since the 1990s unearths some concerns about the structure’s capacity to reduce 
poverty today.    
 Presently, groups at Khelkom access credit through innovative mechanisms.  As 
opposed to rejecting the microfinance model totally, the femmes transformatrices have 
salvaged the basic structure of the GIEs and combined it with their own models of money 
management.  In lieu of waiting for another international program to provide funds, 
women have gone to the banks themselves.  Consequently, the microfinance structure has 
been adapted to access institutionalized funds, albeit from local (and higher interest-
rated) sources.  This hybridization of the microfinance framework speaks both to the 
women’s astounding innovativeness and PROPAC’s implantation of the microfinance 
concept.  At the same time, because PROPAC has left and with it taken low-interest 
group loans, the credit that the women use today is more expensive.  For this reason and 
others that will follow, micro-credit is still largely inaccessible to those who need it most.   
For women who have relatively elevated amounts of financial and social capital, 
however, micro-credit is a very useful business tool.  While these women workers have 
maintained the GIE’s structural integrity, local banking institutions are unfortunately not 
set up to serve groups of micro-entrepreneurs.  Instead, like many traditional banks, 
institutionalized loan agencies prefer to lend to individuals.  This restriction could be 
understood as a constraint to the group lending structure that PROPAC initiated.  Yet, 
equipped with financial vocabularies, women workers have appropriated the banking 
structure to meet their collective needs.  They present themselves to banks as individuals.  
Group members accomplish this by electing the woman with the best credit rating as the 
group’s representative, or president.  She must also have a bank account at the financial 
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institution which is usually funded collectively by group members through small deposits 
over time.  Thus, while this savings account is officially the president’s account in the 
eyes of the bank, in reality it is a joint savings account of the group members.  In 
addition, banks and local credit unions will also hold titles to land or homes of the 
group’s president as physical collateral.  The local financial institution will then assess 
the credibility of the president in terms of her physical assets and her community 
reputation.  Then, the bank will issue a loan according to institutional guidelines.  
Consequently, it is in the group’s best interest to elect as president the woman with the 
highest financial and social capital.  This ensures that the loan allocated by the bank will 
be the largest one possible.  In turn, the president-elect will borrow the maximum amount 
of money allowed by the local credit union or small bank and turn the funds over to the 
group.  The treasurer then organizes the dispersal and reimbursement of the funds among 
the members so that the loan is paid back in full and on time to the local credit 
institution1.
An administrator at one of the local credit unions insisted that repayment reaches 
virtually 100 percent2. This reflects the collective responsibility engendered by the 
evolved structure; group members understand that if they do not repay, their joint savings 
and the physical property of the president will be liquidated, making peer pressure the 
primary mechanism of effective loan repayment.  Thus, the GIEs established with the 
help of PROPAC have facilitated economic cooperation among some women workers.  
On the other hand, because of the increased risk-taking entailed for the president-elect 
vis-à-vis the bank and her credit rating, GIEs tend to be composed of women with similar 
 
1 The functioning of the current credit system was collected from formal interviews with Fatou Kandje and 
Boucar Diouf while it was corroborated with informal interviews with Oumey Diop and Juma Gom.   
2 Interview with Bounar Dious, who works at MECDPJ, a local credit union.  
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socioeconomic status (SES).  Interestingly, many interviewees commented that poorer 
women are riskier group members because they “eat their money” instead of investing it 
in a business.  Clearly, “eaten” loans do not provide the kind of money that it takes to 
make more and in turn, re-pay debts.  This has important implications for the issue of 
poverty reduction.  While the structure is innovative in that it expands access to women 
who are on the limits of a traditional bank’s lending requirements, it does not help 
women who are on the limits of everyday survival.   
Membership patterns then have pointed to existing, more affluent micro-
entrepreneurs as the most likely participants in microfinance at Khelkom, suggesting that 
microfinance’s ability to reduce extreme poverty is limited.  Regardless, for the purposes 
of this study it is still valuable to see if micro-credit is helping to raise participants’ 
incomes.  Once more, quantitative data is not available to aid in this analysis.  
Nevertheless, examining the mechanisms by which the current system functions can 
provide a general idea of how, if at all, microfinance is enhancing women participants’ 
incomes.   
In fact, evolved microfinance is helping some women more than others.  As a 
result of the leadership structure that elects the person with the highest financial and 
social capital as president to borrow money from the bank, the (relatively) rich inevitably 
become richer.  This happens because the loan is taken out in the name of the president 
only.  Hence, when the entire group repays on-time, only the president’s individual credit 
rating improves.  This means that collective effort, in a sense, is translated into personal 
earnings.  Though an increased credit rating will result in an increased collective loan for 
the group members next time they apply, only the president builds an institutionalized 
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credit rating.  Furthermore, credibility is central to home ownership- a gateway that 
allows individuals to take out more loans, furthering the earning capacities of local elites.  
Thus, endemic to the current leadership microfinance structure is the perpetuation of 
local hierarchies.  Perhaps leadership arrangements even contribute to greater relative 
inequality between group members.  While the leadership structure allows group 
members to access formalized credit, it also ensures that financial benefits are distributed 
unevenly among group members.  This finding echoes the thread in the literature that 
MFIs perpetuate local hierarchies instead of transforming them (Fernando 1997; Rankin 
2002).  Though this structural consideration does not directly address the issue of 
increased income for all women participants, it does have consequences for relatively 
prosperous micro-entrepreneurs.  At the very least, microfinance has the potential to help 
this population build strong credit ratings.  The topic of home ownership is central to 
understanding female financial autonomy, the details of which are forthcoming.     
In sum, while functioning microfinance at Khelkom can be understood as a hybrid 
born of international models and local adaptations, clearly it is not meeting the espoused 
goals of microfinance in the development discourse.  Microfinance in this context is not 
acting as an effective poverty alleviation tool simply because it is not servicing the 
poorest women.  It may be helping some better-off women enhance their incomes, 
however, while such economic benefits are most likely distributed according to long-
standing social and economic hierarchies.  Though systematic data was not collected 
concerning individual incomes, the leadership structure of the groups does show potential 
for significant increases in income, albeit for a limited population of elites.     
* * * * *
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Though it was clear to me that microfinance was not reaching the poorest of the 
poor and that enhancing income for some women involved excluding the less fortunate 
from microfinance networks, the question of empowerment within the domestic realm 
was more elusive.   
My host family complicated things.  As one of three co-wives, my host mother 
was a matriarch of a very large family.  In her own six-bedroom home there lived sixteen 
people, seventeen including her husband who would sleep over on a strict, rotating 
schedule.  I remember the first time he slept over during my stay.  Fuming, I could not 
think of a more offensive double standard.  There he was, maintaining three marital 
relationships while his wives were restricted to monogamy.  Did he actually think that he 
was God’s gift to women?  I squirmed as I squelched my desire to scream at the top of 
my lungs: “What about their sexual needs, machoiste (chauvinist)!?!”  But, the words 
never came.  Instead, we just sat there.  With me, painfully trying to swallow spoonfuls of 
fish and rice and him, eating contently, unaware of my boiling and self-righteous 
feminism.     
I took a walk after dinner.  And in retrospect I am grateful that cultural sensitivity 
won my internal battle.  I could just imagine how my anger would have translated to that 
75 year-old man with whitening hair and a gentle smile.  Besides, my host mother was 
happy with her life.  And wasn’t she the one that mattered?      
In contrast to my own expectations associated with polygamous marriage, I was 
surprised to find out that my host mother enjoyed considerable social and political power 
in regards to her family and larger community.  She certainly was in charge of our 
household’s daily budget, for example.  Also, once the women at work realized where I 
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was staying they started asking after my host mother regularly.  They would even send 
me home with gifts every once in a while.  On occasion, the mayor would stop by the 
house or her boutique in the market to request her opinion on political matters.  New 
questions arose along with my observations.  Did she hold this power because she had 
more maneuvering room within her marriage as compared to her monogamous peers?  
Was the time spent without her husband the determining factor for her apparent 
independence?  Was her case the exception or the rule?   
As I started to consider the possibility of polygamy having real benefits for 
women, I realized that it was a topic that many Senegalese women grappled with.  In 
addition, polygamy provided a rich unit of analysis for understanding gender roles in 
contemporary Senegalese society.  From my stack of weathered articles in my pack, I 
learned that many scholars considered ideology central to women translating income into 
power as well.  I decided that family values would be a good place to start engaging this 
conversation.  Incidentally, polygamy provided a lens through which I could begin to 
understand how a woman’s enhanced earnings affected her household decision-making 
power vis-à-vis her husband.  In this vein, the following section will approach the central 
question of this paper: what is the role of microfinance in women’s empowerment in the 
urban, polygamous and Senegalese context?  Could the possibility of enhanced income 
really translate into enhanced power for women living as polygamous wives?   
* * * * *
Women’s Empowerment: an issue of income or ideology? 
Employment is a crucial ingredient in microfinance’s recipe for economic 
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development.  The logic is that women’s improved social position comes from breaking 
out of the confines of the home and finding public sector employment.  Unlike domestic 
labor, public sphere employment generates income. Those who assert that money in 
women’s pockets matters, or even is the determining factor of female empowerment 
agree that employment is fundamental.  Thus, in order to raise questions about how 
women micro-entrepreneurs do or do not translate enhanced incomes into social power, 
we must first contextualize female employment.  Specifically, what forces contribute to 
female public sphere employment in the Khelkom context?   
Largely, it is more expensive to live in Senegal today then 25 years ago.  As 
the country has integrated into the global economy, commodity prices have risen (UN 
2004).  At the same time, programs of structural adjustment have drastically cut social 
welfare services, making it more difficult for poor families to survive.  This is especially 
salient in the case of newly urbanized families that are transitioning from an agricultural 
subsistence to the wage economy (Goldsmith et al 2004).  While such structural changes 
may affect the poorest families the most, however, all Senegalese feel the pressure of a 
rising cost of living.  In many cases, male incomes simply do not cover all household 
expenses.  In others, men can not find formal sector jobs.  Since women increasingly 
cannot rely on the state or their husbands to feed their children, many are entering the 
informal sector in search of new sources of family income.   
In the polygamous context, household economics may be facilitating female 
employment as well.  In a world with no dishwashers or laundry machines, women’s 
domestic work regardless of marital status is enormous.  However, there are indicators 
that polygamous marriage may lessen co-wives’ domestic responsibilities. This is 
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because of the principle of female equality among co-wives in terms of domestic labor.  
One co-wife explained it best at a focus group of women living in the neighborhood 
adjacent to Khelkom.
Polygamy, it is good for work.  One woman can work at Khelkom while the other 
takes care of your house.  They can change roles that way.  For a couple days you 
will cook and your co-wife will work with the fish.  Then, you will work with the 
fish when she cooks.  You see- polygamy, it is good for work.   
This explanation highlights how shared domestic work can provide opportunities 
for co-wives to work outside of the home.  On another practical level, polygamous 
families tend to be larger families which mean, at the very least, more mouths to feed.  
This echoes many interviewees who explained that “women work when there are big 
families to support.”  It follows that in cities, more mouths to feed necessitate more 
income.  Because of their sheer numbers then, urbanized and polygamous families may 
be more expensive to support.  Furthermore, unlike in rural areas where family-based 
agriculture would dominate female economic activity outside of the home, cities provide 
more opportunities to find paid employment and fewer sources of food from family labor.  
As a result, polygamy can be seen as a facilitator to female public sector employment in 
the urban and Senegalese context.   
Religious guidelines have historically supported this work arrangement as well 
(Callaway and Creevey 1994).  Thus, the polygamous household in the urban economy 
may contribute to a female role as income provider while providing a legitimizing 
ideology as a means to that end.  In short, both macro- and microeconomic factors 
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facilitate female employment outside of the home in the urban, polygamous and 
Senegalese milieu.    
The “fit” for microfinance   
 Since this study is interested in microfinance’s role in power relations, the 
dynamics of the structure and its interactions with urban co-wives begs analysis.  If 
income is the connection between women and empowerment, then we must ask: what 
role does microfinance play in enhancing the incomes of the studied population?  Or 
perhaps more realistically, what is the potential for microfinance improving the incomes 
of urban co-wives?  While survey results do not provide conclusive evidence about 
quantitative changes over time, data will show that women in polygamous marriages are 
especially apt candidates for microfinance services at Khelkom. At the very least, this 
implies that urban co-wives have expanded economic opportunities because of their mere 
access to the benefits that microfinance may offer.    
Compared to the survey population as a whole, women in polygamous marriages 
use evolved microfinance more frequently than women not in such marriages.  Survey 
results show that slightly more co-wives are involved in microfinance than are women 
who are outside polygamous relationships, or 77 percent compared to 65 percent.  This 
suggests a possible connection between polygamy and microfinance usage at Khelkom,
although limited cases mean these statistical differences may not be significant. However, 
the argument that urban co-wives tend to have greater access to microfinance is bolstered 
upon closer examination.  Of the three co-wives who do not participate, two borrow from 
local banks individually.  Incidentally they are both homeowners.  This is important 
because these women would qualify for membership in a microfinance group according 
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to given information about the groups’ economic configurations.  One could even make 
the argument that these women would be welcomed by their peers to start lending groups 
of their own.  In this light twelve out of thirteen, or 92% of co-wives qualify for 
microfinance participation.  It seems then, that co-wives tend to dominate the specific 
socioeconomic strata that accesses microfinance at Khelkom. The topic of income 
control further reinforces the affinity between co-wives and microfinance. Within the 
polygamous framework, women’s control over their own incomes is a well-established 
principle (Callaway and Creevey 1994).  In addition, like college students who share bills 
with their housemates, living expenses are defrayed when co-wives live in one 
household.  When the financial benefits of communal living are combined with female 
control over income, saving money becomes more possible.  Furthermore, the ability to 
save is a pre-requisite for membership in evolved microfinance groups at Khelkom.
Because of these tendencies, urban co-wives may have a greater earning capacity than 
their monogamous and unmarried peers.    
Does empowerment have a price tag?  
 Even though urban co-wives tend to be solid candidates for microfinance, the 
issue of empowerment has not yet been directly addressed.  Those who propose that 
income is the crucial component in enhancing female social power would suggest that 
microfinance and micro-entrepreneurship automatically empower women if they succeed 
in capturing and holding onto their own earned money.  The polygamous women working 
at Khelkom are one population that can help us assess this claim.  Does enhanced income 
translate into increased decision-making in the household relative to husbands and other 
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wives, for example, or into enhanced self-esteem or entitlement to hold the symbolic 
head of house role?  Survey results will help address this question.   
All survey participants were self-employed.  Though indirectly, this fact suggests 
that all women have some income with which they support their micro-businesses and in 
turn, their families.  Despite this commonality, however, the majority of women surveyed 
(17/23) like those in polygamous marriages (8/13) reported someone other than 
themselves as head of household.  This finding highlights two considerations.  Revenue is 
not translating into this kind of symbolic social power across all levels of earned income.  
Interestingly, however, some women do consider themselves as sources of household 
authority.  What is the distinction between the women who have translated income into 
social power in the form of claimed family leadership and those who have not?  Is there 
something we can learn from their success? 
Here is where the urban element of polygamy is so central.  In the city 
environment, polygamy diversifies the spectrum of possible living arrangements for 
families.  Similar to the rural scenario, urban co-wives can share living space with each 
other and their husband.  This would mean one house for numerous wives.  In cities, 
however, co-wives have more opportunities to live apart because family economic 
activity is not limited to the farm.  This would mean multiple houses for multiple co-
wives assuming adequate income.  Interestingly, analysis of these two sub-groups helps 
explain who the women are that claim social power. 
It is women who live separate from their co-wives that tend to feel entitled 
enough to claim themselves as heads of the household.  In contrast, women who share a 
home with their co-wives overwhelmingly (4/5) report their husband as head of 
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household.  Moreover, the one outlier cites her husband’s first wife as head of household, 
showing that not one woman in this sub-group considers herself in a position of 
household power.  One plausible explanation is that male domination of such households 
correlates with the conflict resolution role husbands tend to assume in face of domestic 
disputes among co-wives, though no primary data is available to corroborate this 
interpretation.  The majority of co-wives who maintain their own households (5/8), 
alternatively, say that they are the heads of their own households.  While some women 
(3/8) still consider their husbands the primary decision-makers, the contrast between the 
two sub-groups’ testimonies is noteworthy.  While it is impossible to say that the 
association is statistically significant, findings do suggest that there is a relationship 
between living arrangement and entitlement to the head of household role for urban 
women living in polygamous marriages.  Are there any other indicators that can help 
describe this relationship?   
 Not surprisingly, home ownership is the crucial variable in determining if women 
from the given populations claim household power.  In turn, home ownership seems to be 
roughly associated with living arrangement.  Nearly all (4/5) co-wives who live together 
report that their husband is the owner of their home.  The one woman who deviates from 
this trend tells that she lives along with her co-wives and husband in a rented apartment.  
Most (6/8) co-wives living in separate households, conversely, own their own homes.  
The two outliers in this case define themselves as renters as opposed to home owners.  
Furthermore, 87.5 percent of women in this group report being responsible for “all” 
expenses in their households while the remaining interviewee states that she is 
responsible for “almost all” expenditures.  Hence the entire group of relatively 
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empowered co-wives demonstrates a considerable degree of economic autonomy from 
their husbands.  Indeed, nearly all of these privileged polygamous wives control how 
money is spent in their own homes.  Such financial independence has been shown to be 
central to female empowerment.  So, for this limited population, the variable of home 
ownership seems to distinguish between those women who feel entitled to household 
authority from those who do not.  These findings echo Blumberg’s argument that control 
of income and ownership of property determine if women translate earnings into social 
power (1988), suggesting that implied income in the form of home ownership matters to 
female empowerment in this context.   
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the second, relatively empowered group of 
micro-entrepreneurs simply had more money to begin with.  Perhaps these women are 
more successful businesswomen than the first group’s members.  What we don’t know, 
unfortunately, is if the women who live alone have higher self-earned income than those 
who do not.  It may be precisely their greater incomes that have permitted them to 
establish separate residences and to claim household leadership roles.  If it could be 
shown that such an association exists, findings would confirm the theory of “income 
threshold effects” (Grasmuck and Espinal 2000) that predicts that increases in income 
result in increases in social power up to a certain point.  In the studied context, however, 
there are no indications that a backlash exists for relatively successful women micro-
entrepreneurs.  Instead, preliminary evidence suggests that there may be particular 
incentives for urban co-wives to earn incomes.  The goal of moving away from the 
domestic confines of a shared, polygamous living arrangement and establishing one’s 
own household could be one possible motivation.  Translating income into decision-
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making power could be another.  Thus, in certain contexts where polygamy serves as a 
legitimizing ideology for women’s work in the public sphere and when polygamous 
wives are successful enough to invest in a house and support an entire household, then 
such urban co-wives may claim increased decision-making power vis-à-vis her husband.  
In this light, polygamy has the potential to act as a pathway through which women can 
translate enhanced earnings into social power.  Furthermore, the potential of 
microfinance to facilitate such improved incomes and the necessary credit ratings with 
which to buy homes should not be forgotten.  Indeed, in this scenario it seems that 
income and ideology both matter.   
What does empowerment look like? 
 Though increased household decision-making power has been treated as a 
desirable outcome for women micro-entrepreneurs in this study, the possibility for 
relatively privileged polygamous wives to maintain individual homes re-introduces the 
problem of the “double whammy” (Boserup 1970).  When urban co-wives move into 
their own homes, they tend to simultaneously assume full domestic and financial 
responsibilities for their households.  Inevitably, there are costs as well as benefits to this 
transition.  One trade-off especially pertinent to this study will be briefly examined.  How 
do privileged polygamous wives compensate for the lost domestic labor of their co-wives 
once they move to their own homes?  
 A majority (6/8) of women in this population report that they, along with their 
daughters are responsible for domestic labor in their new households.  The remaining 
interviewees admit that they employ maids to help with the cooking, cleaning and 
laundry.  These two relatively prosperous women aside, empowered co-wives tend to rely 
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on the domestic labor of adolescent daughters to compensate for the lost domestic labor 
incurred in the move to individual households.  This tendency is contextualized when one 
considers that the mean age of this population is 39 years old.  Along with a population 
mean of 18 years at first marriage, age is an important consideration because it shows that 
women tend to pursue employment outside of the home once they have already 
established their marital relationships.  In addition, reports concerning household 
responsibility show that privileged polygamous wives tend to set up individual homes 
when their female children are old enough to assume some household responsibilities.  
Though these findings are not statistically significant, taken together, they do suggest that 
relatively empowered co-wives find ways to compensate for the lost domestic labor of 
their peers.       
While the evolution of microfinance at Khelkom may have contributed to the 
perpetuation of social hierarchies among women, polygamy may provide a pathway 
through which some women may experience relative gender equality vis-à-vis their 
husbands.  Hence, while microfinance’s benefits may be distributed unevenly among 
female micro-entrepreneurs, those who are able to make micro-credit services work for 
them in the context of urban polygamy may be able to translate enhanced earnings into 
enhanced household power.  The interaction of the polygamous family and microfinance 
structures in this process suggests that both income and ideology are central to women’s 




 This study has confirmed that microfinance may not be addressing the needs of 
the poorest of the poor in urban Senegal as a privatized social welfare program.  Instead, I 
have suggested that while microfinance is not an effective poverty alleviation tool in the 
studied context, it may have real economic benefits for some women micro-
entrepreneurs.  Urban co-wives may be particularly fit candidates for evolved lending 
groups in the Khelkom context despite findings that the microfinance structure there may 
be perpetuating local hierarchies.  Such potential for exacerbating inequalities among 
women stands in contrast to the relatively egalitarian power relations encouraged by local 
tontine models of microfinance.  Regardless, there are preliminary indicators that some 
women may be enhancing their self-earned incomes as a result of microfinance 
participation.  Access to income is a central component of women’s empowerment.      
While extremely male-dominated societies with patriarchal religions may serve as 
a kind of “discount factor” that chips away at women’s individual income gains, religious 
ideals and historical circumstances may validate the means to women’s empowerment in 
some cases such as a polygamous context.  Consequently, polygamy can even be 
understood as an ideology aiding in income’s transformation into power for women.  At 
the same time, not all co-wives are equally empowered.  Notably, those women who do 
manage to translate enhanced income into social power tend to be those who have 
extricated themselves from shared polygamous living arrangements.  This consideration 
helps make the case that women’s empowerment is a complex process that requires both 
female income and a value system that validates such productivity.  Meanwhile, over 25 
percent of the Senegalese population is living on less than one US dollar each day, 
adapting to make use of what little they have.     
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Since when have you been married? 
 
OWNERSHIP OF WORK 
Do you have a boss?  If yes, who is it? 
Are you a boss? 
Do you pay other people to work for you?  
 At Khelkom? 
 At home? (ie. Do you have any maids ?) 
Since when have you worked in the fishing industry? 
When you go to the port, about how many cartons do you buy?  Minimum, maximum for 
example.   
 
FINANCIAL AGENCY 
What expenses are you responsible for in your household? 
 Do you pay for electricity or water? 
Do you own your own home? 
Who manages the money at your house? 
 
FAMILY LEADERSHIP 
Who does the cleaning, cooking and laundry at your house? 
How many people do you live with? 
Who is the chef de famille at your house? 
Do you have any co-wives?  If so, how many?  Are you the first, the second..? 
 Do you live together? 
 
MICROFINANCE USAGE 
Are you a member of a tontine (ROSCA)? 
Are you a member of a groupement? 
Do you borrow money from the bank individually?  If yes, which bank?  
 
